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Abstract:  
The recent crisis has revealed the potentially dramatic consequences of allowing the 
build-up of an overstretched leverage of the financial system, and prompted proposals 
by bank supervisors to significantly tighten bank capital requirements as part of the new 
Basel 3 regulations. Although these proposals have been fiercely debated ever since, 
the empirical question of the macroeconomic consequences of shocks to banks’ 
leverage, be they policy induced or not, remains still largely unsettled. In this paper, we 
aim to overcome some longstanding identification issues hampering such assessments 
and propose a new approach based on a data-rich environment at both the micro (bank) 
level and the macro level, using a combination of bank panel regressions and 
macroeconomic factor models. We first identify bank leverage shocks at the micro level 
and aggregate them to an economy-wide measure. We then compute impulse 
responses of a large array of macroeconomic indicators to our aggregate bank leverage 
shock, using the new methodology developed by Ng and Stevanovic (2012). We find 
significant and robust evidence of a contractionary impact of an unexpected shock 
reducing the leverage of large banks. 
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1 Introduction
Fluctuations in the leverage of large nancial institutions have been identied as both a
major driver of the accumulation of risks leading to the subprime crisis of 2007-2009 and an
important amplication channel of the nancial crisis itself, as well as a means of transmit-
ting it to the real economy. For instance, Adrian and Shin (2010) have pointed out that, in
a nancial system in which the balance sheets of major institutions are continuously marked
to market, leverage adjustments appear to be strongly pro-cyclical, thus fueling asset price
booms as well as amplifying asset price busts. Based on the widespread view that on the
eve of the nancial crisis the leverage of many large nancial institutions was overstretched
and their core equity basis too narrow with respect to the risks really borne, bank super-
visors worldwide swiftly reacted and proposed as early as the end of 2009 to signicantly
strengthen bank capital and liquidity regulations. The resulting so-called Basel 3 package
of September 2010 thus notably includes a substantial increase in both the quantity and
quality of core capital relative to risk-weighted assets, and also paves the way for the intro-
duction of a new regulatory leverage ratio (i.e. unadjusted for estimated risks) towards the
end of this decade1.
Since then, the empirical question of the macroeconomic consequences of new regula-
tions aimed at raising bank capital requirements has been the subject of a erce debate
and numerous investigations, both by academics and regulators. While the nancial in-
dustry has produced alarming estimates of the potentially contractionary consequences of
such regulations (IIF, 2010), claiming that more stringent capital regulations would im-
ply higher bank funding costs and reduced lending, some researchers have argued that, at
least in the long run, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem should roughly apply and
bank capital should not be that expensive (Admati et al., 2010). Searching for a robust
empirical assessment, the Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG) associated with the
Basel Committee has recently tried to assess the median impact on aggregate credit and
real GDP of imposing higher capital requirements, based on the results of a large range of
di¤erent structural and statistical models. Overall, the MAGs estimates point to only a
modest recessionary impact of a transition towards higher capital standards, provided the
phasing-in is progressive enough. Although the MAG produced an impressive amount of
results in a very short period of time, their approach, based on an ad hoc combination of
heterogenous and not necessarily consistent models, su¤ers from (acknowledged) method-
1Cf. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) for more details.
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ological shortcomings in its attempt to reconcile the facts observed at the microeconomic (or
bank) level with macroeconomic developments. Enough room is thus left for new empirical
investigations.
In this paper, we propose a new approach to assessing the macroeconomic consequences
of a shock to the capital-to-asset ratio of large US bank holding companies. A specicity
of our work is that we base our estimates on an integrated framework that relies on a
rich database of both bank balance sheet information and macroeconomic aggregates, thus
bridging the usual gap in the literature between micro- and macroeconomic assessments of
the e¤ects of bank capital uctuations on lending and growth.
Although a large literature has already tackled this issue, gauging the macroeconomic
impact of a shock to bank leverage, as measured by a banks capital-to-asset ratio, remains
a di¢ cult task.2 A rst identication problem arises from the fact that uctuations in bank
capital ratios, be they measured at the level of individual institutions or at the aggregate
level, are partly endogenous to economic activity. Thus, they cannot as such inform about
the extent of a contraction in credit supply as opposed to a decrease in credit demand
or the consequences of a cyclical degradation in the credit quality of borrowers during
recessions. Valid instruments are needed at the bank level but are not frequently available.3
Alternatively, econometricians dealing with aggregate measures of nancial leverage need
to include su¢ cient controls for demand factors in their regressions and convince that they
deal correctly with endogeneity issues, for instance by using VAR models. However, the
identication of leverage shocks at the aggregate level in a VAR model often relies on ad
hoc restrictions like the short-run restrictions imposed by recursive ordering and Cholesky
decomposition (as in Berrospide and Edge, 2010). This merely reects the fact that adequate
information on bank behavior at the micro level is desperately missing.
A second well-known problem is that highlighting the role of bank capital constraints
in bank lending at the individual level is not necessarily enough to understand their macro
consequences.4 Approaches exploiting the cross-sectional heterogeneity of bank capital at
the micro level look more promising than macro VARs regarding identication issues, but
remain generally unable to quantify the macro consequences of the e¤ects that they identify
at the micro level. Indeed, even if some banks tighten their supply of credit following adverse
2See e.g. Kashyap, Stein, Hanson (2010) for a recent survey.
3The classical studies by Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000) of the consequences of a depletion of the
capital of Japanese banks in Japan on their lending activity in the US provide a rare example of perfect
instrumentation.
4Cf. for instance Ashcraft (2006) for a similar argument regarding assessments of the bank lending
channel of monetary policy.
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capital shocks, economy-wide e¤ects hinge on the dependence of non-nancial agents on
credit from these banks to nance investment and consumption expenditures, as opposed to
other sources of funding. Basically, a general equilibrium framework, when only in reduced
form, is required to be able to reach any conclusion, with a proper multivariate modeling
of a su¢ ciently large set of macro variables representing the economy and encompassing
appropriate aggregate measures of bank capital developments.
Our approach aims to overcome these two identication hurdles. We proceed in four
steps, making use of both bank-level and macroeconomic information in an integrated frame-
work. First, we estimate the vector of "non bank-related" macroeconomic shocks that drive
the bulk of US aggregate business cycle uctuations. We extract these shocks, that we do
not need to identify individually, from a large macroeconomic database using a standard
dynamic factor model as in Stock and Watson (2005). This macroeconomic database in-
cludes a variety of real, nominal and nancial indicators, but no aggregate variable that
has any direct link with bank balance sheets (such as e.g. credit or money aggregates or
aggregate measures of bank lending rates and conditions). Second, we construct measures
of exogenous capital ratio shocks at the bank level, using a dynamic model of bank capital
ratios that we estimate on an unbalanced panel of US large bank holding companies over the
period from 1986 to 2010 with quarterly frequency. In doing this, we include as controls in
our panel regression the space spanned by the macroeconomic shocks that we have obtained
from the rst step. As a consequence, we can be condent that the estimated innovations
to individual bank capital ratios are orthogonal to whatever non credit-related shocks are
needed to explain most of the uctuations in the real variables of interest. Third, we ag-
gregate these individual capital ratio shocks into a macroeconomically relevant measure of
exogenous shocks to the leverage of large banks. Last, this time including credit and other
banking indicators in the list of dependent variables, we estimate the impulse responses of
a large set of macroeconomic variables to this new series of aggregate bank leverage shocks,
using the Factor-augmented Autoregressive Distributed Lag (FADL) methodology recently
proposed by Ng and Stevanovic (2012).
We nd robust evidence that our measure of leverage shocks to the large US banks
matters for understanding uctuations in credit aggregates as well as the US business cycle.
In particular, an unexpected rise in the capital to asset ratio of large banks (akin to a
negative bank leverage shock) triggers a signicant and persistent fall in the growth of
loans across the board, as total commercial bank credit contracts by some 1% on impact for
a shock of 10 basis points, and by about 3% after six quarters. This impact is larger on loans
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to non-nancial rms than on real estate loans. Meanwhile, interest rates on commercial and
industrial loans shoot up on impact, which suggests that our capital ratio shock series indeed
correctly indenties negative credit supply shocks. On the real activity side, investment,
consumption of durable goods and GDP also fall signicantly on impact, although this
fall is more short-lived, suggesting that at least some non-nancial agents may be able to
compensate for the reduction in credit supply and turn to other sources of funding.5 Of
course, some caution is required in interpreting these results in terms of the likely impact
of regulatory capital tightening. Indeed, the innovations on which we base our aggregate
capital ratio shock series may reect a variety of disturbances: stricter requirements imposed
by the regulator or market discipline is one possibility, but another could be unexpected
prots and losses due to some asset price uctuations during the quarter going beyond
expectations based on the information available to bank managers at the beginning of the
quarter or not reected in contemporaneous shocks a¤ecting the real economy. Nevertheless,
if we allow for an asymmetric e¤ect of leverage-reducing and leverage-increasing shocks
on macro aggregates, we nd that the former matter much more that the latter. This
hints that leverage-reducing shocks may impinge on bank credit because they make capital
requirements more constraining. Finally, we compare our results with the macroeconomic
responses we obtain when we plug the measure of aggregate leverage shocks estimated by
Berrospide and Edge (2010) into our FADL setup. This comparison suggests that taking
advantage of the information contained in the bank data has helped us better identify the
variations in agregate leverage that are associated with credit supply shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related empirical
literature on the consequences of bank capital shocks for credit and growth, and highlights
shortcomings of existing approaches. Section 3 explains the modelling strategy. Section 4
presents our selection of banks and our macroeconomic databases. Section 5 details the
model specications and presents the estimation procedure. Section 6 discusses the results.
Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
As mentioned earlier, researchers have long been interested in assessing the economic con-
sequences of uctuations in credit supplied by banks. In particular, the main historical
5Cf. Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) on the nancing mix of rms, as well as, more recently Adrian,
Colla and Shin (2011). The latter suggest that during the nnancial crisis of 2007-2009, bond nancing
made up for almost all the reduction in bank lending to large US rms.
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episodes of severe recessions associated with falling bank credit, bank capital depletion and
bank failures, like the recent crisis, the Great Depression of the 1930s, the US recession
of the early 1990s and Japans "lost decade" in the late 1990s-early 2000s, each time mo-
tivated new waves of empirical contributions aiming to overcome some of the well-known
identication challenges that impede any assessment of the causal impact of bank capital
shocks on loan supply and activity.6
Against this background, our paper relates rst to a strand of empirical studies that
look for new aggregate indicators to be included in small monetary VARs or even univariate
regressions in order to better identify credit supply shocks. These indicators are intended
to provide independent information on bank credit supply and thus help to disentangle
demand and supply e¤ects in the uctuations in observed reduced-form credit aggregates.
A rst example is provided by Peek, Rosengren and Tootel (1999, 2003), who take advantage
of condential supervisory information collected by the US Fed to construct an aggregate
indicator of banksnancial health, dened as the share of assets held by banks falling into
the "CAMEL 5" bucket (i.e. viewed by the regulator as likely to fail in the coming quarters).
They notably show that their bank health indicator predicts unemployment and ination
one year ahead and provide evidence that shocks to this indicator do reect shocks to credit
supply. Morgan (1998) suggests looking rather at the share of loans under commitment
out of total loans, since the former will be less a¤ected by a voluntary contraction in
lending by banks than loans without pre-agreed commitments. Lastly, Lown and Morgan
(2006), for the US, and Ciccarelli et al. (2010), for the euro area, show that indexes of
lending standards, as constructed by central banks from individual answers to loan o¢ cer
surveys on loan conditions, are useful proxies of credit supply. In the same vein, but using a
bottom-up methodology closer to ours, Basset et al. (2011) construct an aggregate summary
series of bank-level innovations to lending standards and use it as an exogenous series of
shocks to bank credit supply in a small monetary VAR of the US economy. Measures of
credit supply building on bank lending surveys indeed look particularly promissing, since by
construction, and to the extent that the answers given by bankers are deemed trustworthy,
the decomposition between developments in credit demand and supply is given. However,
none of these various measures of credit supply are directly related to the capital position of
banks. As such, they may recect binding capital constraints as well as liquidity shortages,
or any other sources of credit supply contractions or expansions (like a change in business
6See, among others, Bernanke (1983), Bernanke and Lown (1991), Woo (2003), Berrospide and Edge
(2010).
5
strategy, for instance).
The panel regression which corresponds to the second step in our estimation strategy
follows on several papers using bank-level regressions to gauge the e¤ects of bank capital
(more precisely bank leverage) on lending (see, e.g., Hancock and Wilcox, 1994, Kashyap
and Stein, 2000 or Berrospide and Edge, 2010). Recently, some researchers have argued
that microeconomic bank-level data alone are insu¢ ciently precise to allow for a correct
identication of the causal impact of bank balance sheet shocks on credit supply and eco-
nomic activity (see Peydro, 2010, for a survey). Indeed, not only is aggregate credit demand
or borrower quality often correlated with aggregate credit supply, but there may be also
a correlation in the cross section. For instance, if poorly capitalized rms that need more
bank funding in bad times tend to match with lowly capitalized banks (as is documented in
the Japanese case by Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap, 2008), estimates of the true negative
e¤ects of bank capital contraction on lending will be biased downwards because lowly cap-
italized banks will face a countercyclical increase in loan demand for which there is no way
to control using bank xed e¤ects alone. As a consequence, several recent studies have used
large loan-level datasets (taken from the credit registers held by the central banks of some
countries), either in panel regressions with rm-bank xed e¤ects or in di¤-in-di¤ setups,
in order to investigate afresh a series of standard issues in empirical banking or assess the
consequences of shocks to bank balance sheets on loan supply during the recent crisis (cf.
e.g. Khwaja and Mian, 2008 and the references cited in Peydro, 2010). However, it is fair
to note that, while papers along this line are obviously very successful in identifying credit
supply e¤ects, they have little to say about the aggregate consequences and fail to account
for general equilibrium e¤ects. By construction, a di¤-in-di¤ approach is indeed suitable for
highlighting how cross-sectional heterogeneity in the situation of banks helps to understand
di¤erent lending behaviour in relative terms, but not for assessing the aggregate e¤ects in
absolute terms. Besides, in such frameworks, there is no way to look at feedback e¤ects
from the macroeconomy to the bank balance sheets.
Last but not least, our study ts into a very recent literature that uses dynamic factor
models in order either to better identify nancial shocks and assess their impact on a number
of macroeconomic aggregates or to jointly exploit the information contained in both large
microeconomic bank balance sheet datasets and small or large macroeconomic databases.
Looking at credit shocks dened as exogenous increases in corporate spreads, Gilchrist et
al. (2010) and Boivin et al. (2009) are two examples of papers exploring the rst avenue.
Daves et al. (2010), Buch et al. (2011) and Jimborean and Mesonnier (2010) are some of
6
the few available studies investigating the second.
3 Modelling strategy
We outline in this section our modeling approach in four steps:
1. Using a dynamic factor model, we rst extract a vector of non-bank macro shocks, t,
from a large macroeconomic database X that gathers series related to real activity,
prices, and market interest rates, but excludes any credit or money indicator;
2. using the estimated bt as controls, we run standard panel regressions of individual
bank capital ratios on banks specic and macroeconomic determinants. We thus
obtain a panel of estimated exogenous innovations to individual bank capital ratios,
denoted b"i;t;
3. We aggregate the bank-specic b"i;t into a macroeconomic measure of exogenous shocks
to capital ratios, b"t;
4. Finally, we compute impulse response functions (IRFs) of the macro variables of inter-
est in X to aggregate capital ratio shocks b"t using the FADL approach. Note that the
exibility of this approach allows us to also compute IRFs of ancillary macro variables
that are not in X, like credit aggregates or bank lending rates.
3.1 Estimation of macroeconomic shocks
The rst step of our approach aims to estimate a vector of "non-bank related" macroeco-
nomic shocks that we can then use as controls in the panel regressions of the second step,
when we model the dynamics of bank capital ratios at the bank level. We extract these
macro shocks from a large database of macro series using a factor method. The database en-
compasses many macroeconomic measures of real activity, prices, interest rates of di¤erent
maturities and some measures of nancial conditions (as corporate bond spreads and broad
stock market index returns), but no money or credit variables. Conceptually, the selection
of the series in this macroeconomic database is thus in line with standard reduced-form
general equilibrium models of the US economy which feature three equations for activity
(IS curve), ination (Phillips curve) and the monetary policy rate (Taylor-like rule).
Let thusX be the chosen TN dataset of macroeconomic aggregated series representing
the US economy. Note here that all series are stationary or have been transformed in
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order to be covariance stationary. We assume that Xt allows for a general dynamic factor
representation:
Xt = (L)ft + ut (1)
ut = D(L)ut 1 + vXt (2)
ft =  1(L)ft 1 +  0vft (3)
where ft contains q common factors that evolve as a vector autoregressive (VAR) process
of order h, (L) is a polynomial matrix of factor loadings of order s, D(L) is a diagonal
polynomial matrix, vXt is a vector white noise process, vft is a vector of q structural shocks
such as demand, supply or monetary policy. We assume that the characteristic roots of
 1(L) are strictly less than one, E(vXitvXjt) = 0, and E(vXitvfkt) = 0 for all i 6= j and for
all k = 1; : : : q.
Remember that the goal of this rst step is not to identify the underlying structural
shocks vft, but merely to control for all of them simultaneously when estimating the leverage
shocks at the bank level, as we explain in details below. Hence, we only need to estimate
the space they span, that is the vector of reduced-form innovations: t =  0vft.
3.2 A dynamic model of bank leverage targeting
The second stage of our analysis consists of estimating a dynamic model of bank capital-
to-asset ratios in order to retrieve a panel of exogenous shocks to the capital ratios at the
individual bank level. For this purpose, we follow Hancock and Wilcox (1994), among
others, and assume that because of some unspecied costs to capital adjustment banks
cannot immediately adjust their capital ratio towards their (time-varying) target.7 The
change in the capital ratio in each period thus depends on the gap between the target and
actual capital ratios in the previous period and on an exogenous shock:
ki;t   ki;t 1 = 
 
ki;t 1   ki;t 1

+ ei;t (4)
where ki;t is the actual capital ratio at (the end of) period t for institution i, ki;t is
the target capital ratio,  a parameter driving the speed of adjustment and ei;t a bank-
specic innovation to leverage. As is standard, the target capital ratio is in turn assumed
to be a linear function of bank-specic characteristics, stacked in a vector Zi;t, and a set
of macro variables, Mi;t, so that ki;t = Z :Zi;t + M :Mi;t. The motivation for choosing
7For recent examples of this approach, see e.g. Berrospide and Edge (2010) and Francis and Osborne
(2012).
8
both sets of variables is the assumption that they belong to the informational basis that
bank o¢ cials routinely monitor when they decide on the "optimal" target ratio for their
specic institution. In particular, the macro variables chosen should reect sources of macro
risks that bankers would take into account in their capital policy. Note that, although the
innovations ei;t are exogenous to the macro variables stacked in Mi;t 1 by construction,
they may not be orthogonal to macroeconomic shocks occurring between t  1 and t, such
as an exogenous real demand shock or an exogenous monetary policy shock. For instance,
a negative monetary policy shock that would imply a rise in the short-term rate during
period t would tend to curtail banks prots, and hence a¤ect their capital through a
lower (or even negative) accumulation of earnings. Let us suppose, as we do in section
3.1 above, that observed uctuations in a large set of macroeconomic variables relevant for
describing the state of the economy can be subsumed to the propagation of a small number
of unobserved common shocks, which are not explicitly related to the state of the banking
sector. Extracting truly structural shocks to individual bankscapital ratios then entails
also controlling for the space spanned by these structural macroeconomic shocks, that is
to say controlling for the vector of reduced-form common shocks t obtained from the rst
step.
Replacing in equation 4, rearranging and adding a bank-specic xed e¤ect, we nally
get our estimation equation for the bank capital ratio:
ki;t = i + (1  ):ki;t 1 + :Z :Zi;t 1 + :M :Mt 1 + :t + "i;t (5)
The residuals "i;t can now be interpreted more convincingly as exogenous shocks to
individual bank capital ratios. Note that these may still reect a variety of circumstances:
changes in the regulatory environment and changes in the specic requirements imposed
by the regulator on a given bank are of course of the essence, but changes in the business
model or risk strategy of the bank (following e.g. the appointment of a new CEO) and
leverage adjustments due to unexpected windfall prots and losses on some assets (which
may not be spanned by the vector of economy-wide macro shocks extracted above) may
also show up. However, by construction, the "i;t should no longer reect the impact on
bank leverage of other macroeconomic shocks that may also drive the business cycle, such
as productivity, real demand or monetary policy shocks. Note that to the extent that a
substantial part of of the uctuations of variables in X may be driven by credit supply
shocks, such shocks may be captured by our estimated t. By controlling for t we are
thus quite conservative against our assumption that pure bank leverage shocks matter for
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explaining macroeconomic uctuations.
3.3 Aggregation
To obtain an aggregate series of exogenous shocks to large bankscapital ratios, b"t, we then
compute a weighted average of the residuals for the banks present in our panel in each
period:
b"t = eNtX
i=1
ai;t 1:b"i;t
where ai;t 1 denotes the share of bank i at period t   1 in the total assets of theeNt = min(Nt; Nt 1) institutions present in the sample. Weighting the individual residuals
by a measure of the relative size of the banks is of the essence since we aim to construct a
measure that is macroeconomically meaningful: intuitively, the macro consequences, if any,
of a leverage shock to a bank totaling $ 200 billion should not be the same as of a shock to
a bank holding less than $ 10 billion.8 Note that we take the lagged share of total banking
assets as weights, instead of the contemporaneous share, because the size of the bank in a
given period is obviously endogenous to the leverage shock received within that period.9
3.4 Impulse response analysis
Last, we implement the Factor-Augmented Distributed Lag (FADL) approach recently pro-
posed by Ng and Stevanovic (2012) in order to estimate the impulse response coe¢ cients of
macro variables of interest to the aggregate bank leverage shock. Once we have estimated
the space spanned by the common macroeconomic shocks, t, and the leverage shock, "t,
the idea of the FADL methodology is to augment an autoregression of a variable of interest,
yt, with current and lagged values of the estimated shocks ^t and "^t:
yt = y(L)yt 1 + (L)^t + "(L)"^t + vyt: (6)
8Following the methodology of Gabaix (2011), Buch and Neugebauer (2011) compute "granular banking
residuals" for a panel of industrial economies including the US, and nd that idiosyncratic changes in the
volume of credit granted by the few largest banks matter for explaining business cycle uctuations.
9Of course, as our panel is unbalanced, this weighting scheme entails that some pure composition e¤ects
may a¤ect the aggregate shock constructed. However, since we impose that banks stay in the panel for
at least 32 periods and most banks indeed stay for a much longer period of time, we may assume that
these composition e¤ects remain small. Indeed, we have constructed an alternative aggregate series of
shocks weighted by the contemporaneous asset shares and checked that our results remained qualitatively
unchanged.
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Let rst suppose that yt belongs to the dataset Xt initialy used to estimate the "non-bank
macro" shocks t.If yt 2 Xt, its FADL representation is derived from the dynamic factor
model (1)-(3), given that D(L) is a diagonal matrix polynomial:
yt = y(L)yt 1 + (1  y(L))y(L)(I    (1)L) 1t + vXyt; (7)
and augmented by "(L)"t. Since t and "t are not observed, we replace them by their
estimates. If the leverage shock is important for yt, the corresponding coe¢ cients should
be signicant.
To construct the impulse responses, we estimate equation (6) by OLS. The dynamic
responses of yt to a unit increase in "^t are dened by
 ^
"
y(L) =
^"(L)
1  ^y(L)L:
Since ^y(L) is a scalar rational polynomial, the impulse response coe¢ cients are easy to
compute using the filter command in matlab. Note that imposing restrictions on FADL
impulse response functions is very easy. For example, to constrain the impact response of
yt to "^t, it is su¢ cient to restrict "(0) = 0. In principle, any linear regression restriction
can be imposed to shape the impulse response functions of interest.
This approach is very appealing in our context for several reasons. Firstly, the identi-
cation of the shock of interest, "t, is done at the micro-level in such a way that bt and b"t
are orthogonal by construction. Hence we do not have to deal with any of the rotation and
identication issues that normally occur within the FADL framework as well as in standard
FAVARs, as discussed at length in Ng and Stevanovic (2012). The previously estimated
leverage shock is simply added to the FADL representation of yt and we only need to pin
down its standard deviation. Secondly, yt does not need to be in Xt. We can estimate
FADL regressions for any variable, and test if it has a factor structure and if it responds
to the leverage shock. As a matter of fact, in the following, we estimate additional FADL
regressions for a selection of credit and banking indicators stacked in an ancillary dataset
Y , which, as detailed in the following section, does not belong to the set of variables in X
used for the extraction of common macro shocks.
Last but not least, it is important to note that, with the FADL approach, restrictions on
the responses of the variables in Xt or Yt, if required by the theory, can be imposed equation
by equation. Restrictions imposed on the IRF of one series thus would not impinge on the
IRF of another one, and would not a¤ect the estimation nor the identication of structural
shocks. That said, we wish here to take an agnostic stance regarding the consequences of
11
bank leverage shocks for the macroeconomy and thus do not impose any restriction to the
impulse responses of the macro variables of interest.
4 Data
A specic feature of our approach is that we use both panel regression techniques on bank-
level data and a time series analysis of macroeconomic variables in a data-rich environment.
In this section, we thus describe at length these di¤erent datasets.
4.1 Constructing a database of large US banks
Our source of bank balance sheet information is the Consolidated Financial Statements
for Bank Holding Companies (FRY-9C) collected by the US Federal Reserve (the "Call
reports"). We consider bank balance sheet information at the level of the Bank Holding
Companies (BHCs) instead of the level of the commercial banks that belong to these groups,
because decisions regarding the choice of the targeted leverage of an institution are arguably
taken at the level of the bank holding or bank group and not necessarily at the level of the
subsidiaries.10 In the following, we use the generic term "banks" to denote the BHCs in
our sample. Our bank database covers the period from 1986 Q1 to 2010 Q1. Notably, the
period of study thus covers the years of implementation of the rst Basel capital regulations
(post 1988), the "credit crunch" episode of the early 1990s, the IT-boom and bust and the
recent subprime crisis, i.e. several time spells in which we can expect large shocks to bank
leverage to have happened with potentially signicant macroeconomic consequences.
As in many developed economies, the US banking system has experienced a large wave
of mergers and acquisitions since the late 1980s. As a consequence, the total population of
bank holding companies as recorded in the initial balance sheet database shrank to 236 in
2010 from more than 330 back in 1986. Besides, the raw database is highly unbalanced,
with 819 di¤erent institutions identied, out of which only 66 are present throughout the
sample period. Finally, a major statistical break occurs in 2006 Q1, when a change in the
reporting guidelines stated that subsidiaries with total assets of more than one billion USD
were no longer required to le a separate reporting. Because of 32 institutions fell into
this category and stopped their reporting at this date, the total cumulated assets of the
10Houston, James and Marcus (1997) and Houston and James (1998) nd that loan growth among a¢ liated
banks is more sensitive to the cash ows and capital position of their holding company than it is to their
own, and that it is less sensitive to their own capital position relative to una¢ liated banks. Overall, their
results suggest that bank holding companies develop internal capital markets to allocate capital among their
subsidiaries.
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reporting banks dropped by some 30% in early 2006.
Taking these features of the initial balance sheet database into account, we designed our
selection of institutions in order to meet a few simple criteria. First, we want to focus on
the largest US bank corporations, expected to have relatively similar leverage behaviors,
so running a panel regression on our set of institutions would make sense. We thus kept
only the banks whose total assets always remained above $ 3 billion.11 Second, we were
concerned about limiting the selection bias due to the attrition of the database over time,
while ensuring some minimal degree of stability through time of the selected sample of
banks. We thus excluded institutions with missing observations of total assets and equity
capital and also banks that remain in the sample for less than thirty-two quarters. Third,
we deleted bank subsidiaries a¤ected by the change in reporting guidelines mentioned above
so as to avoid any double counting.
As said, a large number of mergers and acquisitions have a¤ected the US banking system
since the mid-1980s. We used the Chicago Fed database on M&A involving BHC to identify
bank-quarter observations when such operations took place. Some 356 M&As happened in
our sample, compared to more than 9,600 for the whole BHC population. Contrary to the
practice in many bank panel studies, we do not reconstruct merged banks backwards. Nor
do we rename the acquiring banks from the acquisition date onward, because this would
lead to too many large banks with a too small number of consecutive observations. Instead,
we deal with M&As by including a dummy in the panel regressions presented below.
Our sample nally consisted of 104 large BHCs that represent on average 75% of the
total assets in the US banking sector.12 Figure 1 shows the share of the selected institutions
out of total US banking assets through time. Although the representativeness of our sample
varies somewhat (between 60 percent and 80 percent of the total), it remains su¢ ciently
high throughout compared to similar studies. Note that of the 104 selected institutions only
20 remain present over the whole sample period.
4.2 A rich macroeconomic dataset
In this paper, we use a large number of macroeconomic series for two joint purposes. First,
using a factor model as presented in section 3.1, we want to uncover the space spanned by
real and nominal structural shocks, other than shocks originating from the banking sector,
that may also drive part of the uctuations in bank capital ratios. Second, we want to
11This corresponds roughly to the 55th percentile of banks ranked according to their average total assets
over the period 1986-2010.
12Please see the Appendix for the complete list of banks in our selection.
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be able to ultimately compute the responses of a wide array of aggregate variables to our
estimated bank leverage shocks. We describe here the collection of macroeconomic time
series that we use throughout.
A huge number of time series of aggregate variables representing the US economy are
available to the econometrician for analysis (see e.g. Stock and Watson, 2002, and Bernanke
et al., 2005 for examples of studies using several hundreds of variables). However, selecting
only a few dozen of them may be enough for our purpose, as in Gilchrist et al. (2009).
Indeed a factor structure may not be appropriate for every series. If the additional data are
noisy, uninformative and/or do not satisfy the restrictions of the factor model, it may not
be useful to consider them when estimating the common shocks, as shown in Boivin and
Ng (2006).13
Hence, we construct here two separate macroeconomic datasets. The rst one, denoted
by X, is a comprehensive sample of thirty-one aggregate variables representing a large vari-
ety of real and nominal measures of the state of the US economy, but excluding any money
and credit aggregates or other possible indicators of banks credit supply behavior (like
surveys on credit conditions). This sample is used to extract the common macroeconomic
shocks t that we take as controls when we estimate the bank capital ratio shocks. The
second macroeconomic dataset, denoted by Y , encompasses a list of aggregate credit and
banking indicators that are not included in X.
The variables included in X can be classied into four broad categories: economic ac-
tivity indicators, ination indicators, risk-free interest rates, and other nancial indicators
or asset prices. All series are observed at quarterly frequency and transformed to station-
arity before we apply the factor analysis (cf. Appendix A for details of data sources and
transformations to stationarity applied to individual series).
The selection of real and nominal macro variables partly follows Gilchrist et al. (2010).
In particular, we consider the following twelve indicators of economic activity (with quar-
terly frequency): (1) the capacity utilization index; (2) real GDP; (3) private domestic
investment; (4) the industrial production index; (5) the Institute for Supply Management
(ISM) di¤usion index of activity in the manufacturing sector; (6) non-farm payroll em-
ployment; (7) real personal consumption expenditures (PCE) ; (8) real PCE in durable
goods; (9) real PCE in non-durable goods; (10) the civilian unemployment rate; (11) the
Conference Boards coincident business cycle indicator index; and (12) housing starts.
13Note however that the FADL analysis we implement here only requires a strong factor structure to hold
in the macroeconomic dataset and is less likely to be a¤ected by the presence of weak factors in very large
data sets as noted in Onatski (2009).
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Price developments are summarized by the following seven ination indicators: the log-
di¤erence of (1) the Consumer Price index (CPI); (2) the core CPI; (3) the Producer Price
index (PPI) for all commodities; (4) the PPI for nished goods only (core PPI); (5) the
CRB index of (spot) commodity prices; (6) the price of oil as measured by the price per
barrel of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude; (7) the price of imported goods.
Our broad macroeconomic dataset also includes the entire term structure of interest
rates, starting at the short end with the e¤ective federal funds rate and continuing with the
constant maturity Treasury yields at 6-month, 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 5-year, and 10-year
horizons, for a total of seven interest rates.14
Finally, we also include ve series of asset prices that we deem relevant for understanding
business cycle uctuations in the US since the late 1980s: (1) the nominal e¤ective exchange
rate of the US dollar against a basket of major currencies; the spread of (2) AAA and (3)
BAA corporate bond yields over ten year Treasuries; (4) the S&P 500 equity index and (5)
the FHFA housing price index.
Regarding the additional dataset of credit and banking indicators stacked in Y , we
consider the following series: (1) total commercial bank credit; (2) commercial and industrial
(C&I) loans; (3) consumer loans; (4) real estate loans; (5) loans and leases in bank credit;
(6) total bank deposits; (7) total bank assets of commercial banks; (8) total loans by banks
and thrift corporations. All these series are taken from the H8 statistical release of the
Federal Reserve (Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the U.S), except the last
one (which comes from the Z1 release). In addition, we also consider (9) credit standards,
as taken from the Senior Loan O¢ cer Survey on credit conditions conducted by the Federal
Reserve (a rise in the indicator denotes a tightening of credit conditions to rms); and
(10) the aggregate measure of the leverage of the US commercial banking sector as used
in Berrospide and Edge (2010). This leverage ratio is computed by the Fed on the basis
of individual Call reports as the ratio of the sum of all commercial bank equity to the
sum of all banksassets.15 Although we think this is an inaccurate measure of aggregate
bank leverage, we include it in our selection for comparison purpose. Last, in order to
better gauge whether or not our identied leverage shock is akin to a credit supply shock,
we include several series of credit interest rates: (11) interest rates on personal loans with
maturity up to two years, (12) rates on new car loans with maturity up to 4 years, both
14Although nominal yields exhibit a discernible downward trend over our sample period (19862008), they
are not converted into real terms so as to ensure their approximate stationarity as in Gilchrist et al. (2010).
Indeed, since we extract the factors by iteratred principal components on prewhitened macro series, the
strong persistence of interest rate series is not an issue.
15The series is available from the US Fed FRED database with code EQTA.
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taken from the Survey on consumer credit (G19 release), and measures of (13) average rates
on all C&I loans, (14) on large C&I loans (above $1 million) and (15) on small C&I loans
(below $100 thousand). The latter interest rates series on loans to rms are extracted from
the Survey of terms of business lending (E2 release).
5 Estimation and results
5.1 Estimation of the dynamic factor model
To extract an estimate of the macroeconomic shocks t that drive the common uctuations
of the variables in Xt, we implement an algorithm that builds on the iterative principal com-
ponents (IPC) approach of Stock and Watson (2005). This method is briey summarized
below.
The starting point is the static factor representation of the pre-whitened data xt =
(I  D(L)L)Xt in equations (1-3):
xt = Ft + vXt (8)
Ft = FFt 1 + Ft (9)
where Ft = Gt,  is the N  r matrix of loadings, Ft is r = q(s+ 1) 1 with
 =
0BBB@
1
2
...
N
1CCCA ; Ft =
0BBB@
ft
ft 1
...
ft max(h;s)
1CCCA ; F =
0BBBB@
 1  2 : : :  s
Iq 0 : 0 : 0
0 Iq 0 : 0
: 0 : : 0
0 0 : Iq : 0
1CCCCA i =  i0 i1 : : : is
and G is an r  q matrix that maps the dynamic shocks into the static shocks. The Ft
are the reduced form errors of Ft and are themselves linear combinations of the structural
shocks vft. The algorithm then proceeds in three steps:
Step 1: First, we estimate Ft by iterative principal components (IPC) as in Stock and
Watson (2005).
1.i Initialize Xi (L) using estimates from a univariate AR(q) regression in Xit. Let D(L)
be a diagonal matrix with Xi (L)L on the i-th diagonal.
1.ii Iterate until convergence
min
D(L);;F
SSR =
TX
t=1

(I  D(L)L)Xt   Ft
0
(I  D(L)L)Xt   Ft

:
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1.ii.a Let F^t be the rst k principal components of xx0 using the normalization that
F 0F=T = Ik, where k is the assumed number of static factors.
1.ii.b Estimate D(L) and  by regressing Xit on F^t and lags of Xit.
Step 2: Second, we estimate a VAR in F^t to obtain ^F .
Step 3: Last, we estimate t:
3.i Let ^Xit = xit   ^0i^F F^t 1, where F^t are the iterative principle components of all n
observations of the panel x, ^ and F^t 1 and ^F are obtained from Step (1).
3.ii The estimate of t consists of the rst q principal components of ^Xit.
Step (3) is based on the fact that vit = xit iFt = xit  ^i(^FFt 1 + Ft). Let us now
dene
^Xit = xit   iFFt 1
= iFt + vit
= (iG)t + vit:
As noted in Stock and Watson (2005), the rank of the r  1 vector Ft is only q, since Ft
is generated by q common shocks. In other words, ^Xit itself has a factor structure with
common factors t. Amengual and Watson (2007) show that the principal components of
^Xt can precisely estimate the space spanned by vft. In practice, the dimension of t, q,
is unknown and must be chosen by the econometrician, if possible on the basis of some
statistical tests. In the case of our application, we follow the standard information criteria
proposed by Bai and Ng (2007) and Amengual and Watson (2007) and set the number of
common shocks to q = 3.
Note that, since usual tests conrm that three shocks are su¢ cient to describe the bulk
of the correlations present in X with a small-scale dynamic factor model, then we may be
condent that we have extracted all possible real demand and supply shocks spanning busi-
ness cycle uctuations (up to a rotation). Since our dataset also includes various measures
of prices and short- and long-term interest rates and there is little doubt that the short-term
interest rate is an appropriate measure of the stance of monetary policy in the US over the
period of our study, we may also be quite certain that monetary policy shocks will be also
properly accounted for by these three series of shocks.
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5.2 Estimation of the panel regression
We present in this section the results from the estimation of the bank-level regression (5),
that we repeat here for conveniences sake:
ki;t = i + (1  ):ki;t 1 + :Z :Zi;t 1 + :M :Mt 1 + :bt + "i;t (10)
The bank-specic variables stacked in Zi;t include a measure of bank size (the log of total
assets), a measure of bank protability (the return on assets, or ROA), a measure of asset
risk (the ratio of net-charge-o¤s to assets), and two measures of asset structure (the ratio of
mortgage loans and the ratio of commercial and industrial loans to assets). The rst three
are standard determinants of bank capital ratios in the empirical literature. The relative
shares of real estate loans and loans to rms in bank assets may be viewed as additional
proxies for bank risk, at least through the lense of the rst Basel capital regulations which
imposed weighting C&I loans more than mortgage loans in the computation of regulatory
capital requirements. Alternatively, these simple measures of asset composition may help
to capture some specialization of individual banks. Last, two sets of bank-specic dummy
variables are also included as regressors. First, we add bank-specic dummies that take the
value of one in quarters when the bank has acquired another institution. Second, we also
add dummies capturing a change in status from BHC to Financial Holding Company (FHC).
Indeed, an important institutional change for US banks since 1986 was the adoption of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (GLB Act). This relaxed
the provisions of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act requiring a strict separation of banking and
securities activities. Under the new legislation, BHCs that meet some supervisory standards
are allowed to become FHCs. Switching to the FHC status authorizes a bank to engage
in a range of new nancial and non-nancial activities, possibly a¤ecting both its business
model and its level of risk. Again using information provided by the National Information
Center on US nancial institutions run by the Federal Reserve, we identied 27 changes
from BHC to FHC status and 8 changes back to BHC status in our selection of banks and
we created a dummy variable taking the value of one for observations under FHC status.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the bank-specic variables used in the panel
regressions. The median institution in our sample is already quite large, with assets above
$ 19 billion.16 Nevertheless, some substantial degree of heterogeneity in size remains in the
sample, as the four largest institutions have average assets above $ 400 billion, while the
16For comparison, the median BHC in the sample used by Berropside and Edge (2010) has assets around
$ 3 billions only.
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smallest ones have average assets below $ 5 billion. The distribution of variables scaled by
assets is however more homogenous, be it capital, loans or net charge-o¤s. The average
capital ratio is slightly above 8 percent, which corresponds to a leverage of about 12.5 for
the average bank. Overall, loans to non-nancial clients make up more than 60 percent
of the total in the average banks balance sheet, with mortgage loans representing in turn
about 40 percent of all loans. Average protability, as reected by our measure of ROA, is
2.59 percent, which is broadly in line (but a little lower) with the average ROA for all US
commercial banks over the same period of 25 years.17 Net charge-o¤ rates, which we take as
a proxy for the riskiness of bank assets, are also of the order of magnitude of the available
aggregate statistics for the whole US banking system. Appendix A provides details of data
sources and the denitions of these variables.
Assuming that banks choose their target capital ratio in order to absorb expected future
losses on their assets, any macroeconomic information that is deemed relevant to their
gauging the probability of future losses should also be included in our regression. Indeed,
the ratio of net charge-o¤s alone mainly reects the perceived consequences of current
and past adverse shocks and is rather backward-looking in nature. We consider here two
types of macro control variables in the Mt vector. First, we take the log of the Chicago
Board VIX as a measure of uncertainty on the US equity market. Second, we take the
expectations of two key macroeconomic indicators at a one-year horizon, as collected by the
Survey of Professional forecasters conducted by the Philadelphia Fed. These two measures
of macroeconomic expectations relate to: (1) the expected variation in the short-term rate
of interest (the rate on 3 month T-Bills), (2) the expected rate of growth of real GDP. Table
2 provides some descriptive statistics for this rst set of macro controls. Last but not least,
we include in the regression our estimate of the common macroeconomic common shocks
stacked in bt.
Table 3 presents the estimation results of equation 5. A constant and three seasonal
dummies are included in the regression but not reported for brevity. We estimate the dy-
namic model of bank leverage using OLS with bank xed e¤ects as suggested by preliminary
Hausman tests, and t-stats are computed using the Huber-White robust estimator of vari-
ance.18 Although it is well known that the estimation of a dynamic panel with xed e¤ects
entails the possibility of biased OLS estimates, we rely on the simulation results in Judson
17The average ROA for all US commercial banks (on an unconsolidated basis) is close to 4 percent over
1986-2010.
18Correcting the variance for possible within-correlation at the individual level (clustering) does not make
any di¤erence.
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and Owen (1999), who suggest that this bias drops quickly to zero when the time dimension
of the panel is long enough (more than 30 periods). Since individual banks in our selection
are present on average for 59 periods and always for more than 30, we conclude that a
GMM approach is not required here.
The rst column of Table 3 presents the results when only bank-specic variables are
included as regressors. Columns 2 to 4 show the impact of also including observable macro-
economic variables, like macro expectations, common shocks extracted from the dataset in
X using a dynamic factor model, or both. The full specication in column 4 is our baseline
model in the following.
Whatever the specication, the large coe¢ cient we obtain for the lagged capital ratio
conrms the well-known fact that bank book capital to asset ratios are very persistent at
the institutional level. This implies that the remaining regressors will account for only a
modest share of total variance. Nevertheless, we choose to model the level and not the rst
di¤erence of the ratio, for two reasons: rst, although persistent, capital ratios are by nature
bounded variables, and the economic rationale for assuming that they follow an integrated
process is not clear; second, interpreting the response of macroeconomic variables to a bank
leverage shock as we do below is more intuitive if we construct our aggregate capital shock
series on the basis of innovations to the levels of the individual ratios, not to the changes
in them.
Looking at the role of other bank-specic covariates, we nd a positive correlation
between capital ratios and asset sizes, in line with previous results of Berrospide and Edge
(2010), who also restrict their sample to the largest US BHC. This contrasts, however, with
the results from studies based on larger populations of US commercial banks, including
small ones, which suggest that small banks on average keep higher capital bu¤ers than
large ones.19 Nevertheless, the standard asymmetric information argument that provides a
rationale for this stylized fact of better capitalized small banks may not be very relevant
for the population of large listed BHCs that we look at in this study. Past protability
of assets (lagged ROA) does not turn out to be signicant, but (lagged) net charge-o¤s
are positively correlated with capital ratios, conrming the intuition that bank managers
adjust their capital ratio to compensate for the capital depletion that would eventually
follow a degradation in the quality of assets. Mergers and acquisitions are associated with
a signicant increase in the capital ratio, but a switch to FHC status does not have any
noticeable impact.
19Cf. for instance Kashyap and Stein (1995) and Kishan and Opiela (2000).
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The observable macroeconomic controls included are all signicant, suggesting that their
omission would bias our analysis. As in Berrospide and Edge (2010), a higher volatility in
stock markets tends to imply a lower capital ratio, which may reect higher losses in times
of stress. An expected rise in GDP growth is associated with a decrease in capital ratios,
which hints at a procyclical behavior of bank leverage. Meanwhile, expected policy rate
hikes over the following year are associated with an increase in the current capital ratio,
which suggests that this variable can be seen as a "risk factor" impinging on the expected
protability of assets. Finally, at least one of the lagged common shocks summarizing the
perceived state of the economy emerges as signicant, but at the expense of the expected
GDP growth regressor, suggesting that this estimated structural macro shock accounts for
a large proportion of aggregate GDP uctuations.
5.3 Aggregate measure of bank capital ratio shocks
Figure 2 shows the aggregate series of capital ratios shocks we obtain for the US banking
system. The series has a mean close to zero and a standard deviation of 0.2 percentage
points. According to our measure, the largest negative shocks occurred in the second quarter
of 1987, the third quarter of 1989, the rst quarter of 1994, the rst quarter of 2005, and
then, during the last recession, in the rst semester of 2007 as well as, in the aftermath of
the Lehman failure, the third quarter of 2008. Large positive shocks to bank capital ratios
occured at the end of 2000, just at the onset of the recession triggered by the burst of the
dotcom bubble, and also in the third quarter of 2004 and, last but not least, in early 2009,
possibly as a consequence of the TARP program and the ensuing forced recapitalization of
US banks during 2009.
Note that the panel regression (5) assumes that all banks react in a homogenous way
to bank characteristics, as is commonly assumed, but also to the macro shocks t. This
last assumption may seem at odds with the ndings of Buch, Eickmeier and Prieto (2010),
who analyze the transmission of macroeconomic shocks to bank risk taking (measured as the
share of non-performing loans) and loan growth for the US, using disaggregated information
for a large panel of US commercial banks within a FAVAR model. They notably point to
heterogenous responses to expansionary monetary and house price shocks, as small banks
extend more loans and more capitalized banks tend to make more risky investments (as
can be gauged, with the benet of hindsight, by looking at the change in bad loans over a
horizon of one year). However, it is fair to note that they consider a much more heterogenous
population of some 1500 commercial banks with assets larger than $25 million, whereas we
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focus on a contained sample of some 100 large bank holding companies with assets larger
than $3 billion, so that the potential for heterogenous behaviour at the bank level is a
priori less in our case. Nevertheless, in order to check that our estimated macro shock
to bank capital ratio is immune from the possible consequences of such heterogeneity, we
restimated equation (5) on di¤erent sub-samples of banks, taking into account only the
25 or 50 largest institutions. As regression coe¢ cients (not shown here for brevity) are
not really a¤ected (also less precisely estimated), we nd conrmation of the homogeneity
assumption. Importantly for our purpose, Figure 3 shows that the estimated aggregate
capital ratio shock series also remains broadly unchanged when we restrict the sample to a
smaller number of institutions.
Giving an economic interpretation to the sign of our aggregate shock series is not
straightforward. Indeed, following a positive shock, a bank can increase its capital ra-
tio by only increasing its capital, only decreasing its assets, increasing its capital more than
it inates its assets or decreasing its assets by more than its capital shrinks. In other words
de-leveraging may be associated with either an expansion or a reduction in a banks balance
sheet. Mutatis mutandis, the same applies for a negative shock to bank capital ratios. To
guide intuition, it may help to look at correlations between asset growth, equity growth and
changes in the capital ratios at the individual level. Table 4 shows how the sign of shocks to
the ratio relates to the sign of changes in its numerator (equity) and denominator (assets)
at bank level within our sample. Note that roughly half of the capital ratio shocks in our
sample are positive, which is consistent with the assumption that E("i;t) = 0 in the panel
regression. Looking at positive (i.e. deleveraging) shocks, most if not all of them (94%) are
associated with stable or increasing equity, while about half of them are associated with
increasing assets. In contrast, some 86% of negative ratio (i.e. leveraging) shocks tend to
go in synch with increasing assets, while the equity base goes up in only two thirds of cases.
From this we may guess that negative ratio shocks should have rather expansionary e¤ects
on the economy. The sign of the aggregate consequences of positive ratio shocks remains,
however, unsettled at this stage and should be expected to depend on the size distribution
of shocked banks at each point in time.
5.4 Validating the factor structure of macro series
In practice, having obtained series of realizations of the three real and nominal macro
shocks stacked in t; as well as of the bank capital ratio shock "t, we get estimates of the
parameters in equation (6) by using simple OLS regressions. Since it appears that usual
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information criteria are not very conclusive about the optimal number of lags to include in
each polynomial, we try to keep the model as parsimonious as possible, while allowing for
a su¢ ciently rich dynamic of the response of individual variables to the aggregate capital
ratio shock. We thus choose one lag for the lagged dependent variable, one lag for the non-
banking macro shocks and four lags for the capital ratio shock as our baseline specication.
We nevertheless checked that allowing for a richer lag structure (up to four lags for each
polynomial) does not qualitatively a¤ect our conclusions. A comparison of IRFs for di¤erent
sets of lags of the polyomials in equation (6) is presented in Figures 6-7. The gures conrm
that our main results are quite robust to reasonable changes to lag selection.
An important underlying assumption of our approach is that the series in X have a
factor structure and that the dynamic factors extracted from X also span the ancillary
variables in Y . To check this, we conduct Wald tests of joint signicance of the coe¢ cients
in the FADL regressions of individual macro series, as well as tests of the joint signicance
of the parameters associated with the contemporaneous and lagged bank capital ratio shock
only. Table 5 presents the results, together with the share of the variance of each macro
series that is explained by all regressors vs the capital ratio shock alone. The tests rst
conrm that our shock series indeed span all the real and nominal macro series stacked in
X as well as most of the banking indicators in Y , with the exception of the growth of real
estate loans. Interestingly, the null that capital ratio shocks do not matter for explaining
macro series is rejected (at the 10% level) for several key activity variables, notably GDP,
investment, industrial production, the consumption of non-durables and housing starts, as
well as for the corporate spread. The aggregate capital ratio shock also turns out to be
a signicant determinant of most credit and banking indicators, with the exception of the
growth of deposits and of real estate loans, as well as interest rates on personal and new
car loans. It is important to note that this nding is not as such inconsistent with the fact
that the capital ratio shock is by construction orthogonal to the contemporaneous common
macro shocks driving Xt. Indeed, the capital ratio shock may rst drive the idiosyncratic
component of some of the macro series Xi;t (the ut term in equation 1). Besides, lags of
the capital ratio shock may not be orthogonal with the common shocks in t. Finally, note
that the factor structure also explains a large share of the variance of some key banking
indicators, above 80% for the growth of C&I loans and bank credit rates, although these
indicators were not part of the training sample used to extract the non-banking macro
shocks.
Overall, the results presented in Table 5 suggest that it indeed makes sense to look at
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the IRFs of key macroeconomic and credit indicators to the aggregate capital ratio shock.
6 Assessing the macroeconomic e¤ects of shocks to the lever-
age of large banks
Figure 4 presents the response of a selection of macro variables of interest in Xt to a posi-
tive bank capital ratio shock of one standard deviation (i.e. about 0.2 percentage points),
together with bootstrapped condence intervals at the 70% level.20 First, we nd a large
and signicant contractionary e¤ect on GDP of this unexpected reduction in the leverage of
large banks, with the components of aggregate demand that are a priori most sensitive to
the availability of credit showing the largest reaction on impact. Indeed, total productive
investment decreases by some 2 percentage points on impact, and slightly more in the sec-
ond quarter after the shock. Similarly, consumption of durables drops immediately by some
1.5 percentage points, but the e¤ect is short-lived and vanishes after one quarter. Also,
consumption of non-durables and total consumption contract with a lag during a couple of
quarters after the shock. The responses obtained for interest rates show that, while mone-
tary policy does not seem to react to the bank capital ratio shock itself, the central bank
will lower the short term rate by some 50 basis points two quarters after the shock to coun-
teract its recessionary consequences. This persistent decrease in the policy rate is in turn
reected in lower risk-free interest rates along the whole yield curve. Finally, a deleveraging
shock to bank capital ratios leads to an immediate (although short-lived) increase in the
Baa corporate spread. Interestingly, this result echoes the evidence presented by Gilchrist
and Zakrajsek (2012) regarding the link between their measure of the excess corporate bond
premium - the premium required by corporate bond investors beyond the compensation for
the measured default risk of rms - and the capacity of major nancial institutions to take
risk on their balance sheet, depending in turn on their capital structure. They notably
nd that a deterioration in the protability of broker-dealers leads to rise in their CDS
spreads, a good measure of the perceived default risk of these nancial intermediaries, and
an associated rise in the excess corporate bond premium, reecting their reluctance to take
on additional risk. As Gilchrist and Zakrajsek also provide evidence that this premium em-
bedded in corporate spreads, and to some extent the total corporate spread itself, are good
predictors of future economic activity, this suggests that the consequences of bank leverage
20Note that the response functions are presented in levels for the sake of clarity, which means that they
show the cumulated e¤ects of the capital ratio shock on the growth rates or changes of individual variables
whenever the series are non-stationary (like e.g. GDP).
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shocks for the excess corporate bond premium could provide a channel for the transmission
of these shocks to activity, beyond the direct e¤ect on lending.
Figure 5 in turn presents the responses of the credit and banking indicators stacked in
Y , which we do not take into account when extracting the real and nominal shock series
from the general macro dataset. Note that, again, none of these IRFs are constrained.
Most interestingly, we nd a large, signicant, immediate and persistent decrease in most
measures of aggregate credit considered, with the weakest response for consumer credit.
Credit to rms (C&I loans and loans & leases) contracts more than credit to households for
housing purposes, by some 2.5% on impact and 10% over the rst year. Overall, a positive
shock to bank capital ratios (i.e. a negative aggregate bank leverage shock) triggers a large
and persistent fall in total bank credit and total bank assets over at least six quarters. Total
commercial bank credit drops by 2% on impact and about 6% over the following year, the
magnitude being similar for bank assets. Last but not least, we nd that the deleveraging
shock implies a signicant rise in the spreads between some bank credit rates and monetary
policy rates. The increase is notably large and persistent for interest rates on small loans
to rms. The combination of decreasing loan volumes and increasing loan rates suggests
that our estimated bank capital ratio shock does identify properly a negative credit supply
shock. This is all the more noteworthy that we do not need to impose any sign restrictions
to identify this shock.
The last two panels at the bottom of Figure 5 show the reaction of two other indicators
used in related studies: the index of tightening of credit conditions according to the Loan
O¢ cer Survey, and the aggregate measure of the leverage of all US commercial banks as
computed in the Flow of funds.21 Credit standards do not seem to tighten following a
positive shock to bank capital ratios, which suggests that, at least over our sample period,
credit standards were not primarily tightened because of capital constraints on the side of
banks.22 This tends to be conrmed by the almost zero correlation we observe between our
capital ratio shock and the aggreate bank lending standard shock provided by Basset et al.
21Due to a shorter available time series, the IRF for these last two variables are estimated over the period
from 1992 to 2010.
22This may hold in aggregate, although some banks may indeed have tigntened standards and cut lending
as a consequence of scarce capital, and in particular most recently in anticipation of more stringent Basel
3 capital requirements. In a recent paper, Basset and Covas (2012) use banks own assessments of their
capital adequacy as reported to the Feds Survey on lending standards to study the link between capital
adequacy and lending over the period 1996-2010.They nd reduced loan growth at banks that tighten lending
standards as a result of concerns about their current or future capital position relative to banks that do not
report being capital constrained.
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(2011).23 Finally, we check that a positive capitalization shock according to our measure is
indeed associated with a rise in the aggregate measure of US commercial bank leverage as
taken from the FRED database.
As is apparent from the time series of the estimated aggregate bank capital ratio shocks
in Figure 2, the amplitude of the capital ratio shocks during the climax of the recent nancial
crisis was quite unprecedented. This raises the question as to whether the obtained impulse
responses only reect the state of correlations during the crisis, or whether at least the
sign of the responses is robust to the exclusion of the crisis episode. To check this, we
re-run all regressions of macro variables on the estimated shocks on a sub-period ending
in the second quarter of 2008, that is before the failure of Lehman and the intensication
of the turmoil. Figures 8 and 9 present the estimated impulse responses for general macro
variables and credit and banking variables respectively. Although the size of the responses
is smaller, which is partly due to the fact that the standard deviation of the capital ratio
shock is smaller over the pre-crisis period, the sign and shape of the responses are largely
unchanged, which conrms the robustness of our baseline results.
All the results presented above are based on the implicit assumption that positive and
negative shocks to bank capital ratios have symmetric e¤ects on aggregate credit and eco-
nomic activity. However, this is far from certain, since an unexpected increase in capital
ratios (a reduction in leverage) may reect a binding capital constraint, be it regulatory
or imposed by market discipline, while an unexpected decrease in capital ratios (a surge
in leverage) may not. To investigate possible asymmetric e¤ects of bank leverage shocks,
we thus run the same regressions of all the macro variables on their lags and our estimates
of macro and bank capital shocks, but we replace the b"t series with both its positive and
negative parts -i.e. max(b"t; 0) and min(b"t; 0). Figures 10 and 13 respectively present the
asymmetric responses of general macro variables and credit and banking indicators to the
positive and the negative shocks.
Interestingly, we nd a strongly asymmetric e¤ect of positive capital ratio shocks, as
opposed to negative ones, on real activity and credit. While real activity and aggregate
bank credit still contract on impact after an asymmetric deleveraging shock, the size of
this contraction is larger than it was before under the assumption of a symmetric response
to the capital ratio shock. For instance, the immediate response of GDP and productive
23As we do here, BCDZ proceed in two steps, taking advantage of detailed information available at the
bank level. They rst construct exogenous shocks to banks individual responses to the SLOOS, using a
panel regression of individual tightening indexes on bank-specic and macro indicators, and then aggregate
these individual innovations as a weighted average.
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investment is about twice as large, while the response of C&I loans is about 1.5 times larger
after one year. Moreover, the average interest rate on C&I loans increases on impact by
some two percentage points and remains higher for almost a year. In contrast, we nd
no signicant response of either GDP or investment over the rst few quarters after an
asymmetric shock increasing bank leverage. On the credit side however, we note a short-
lived increase in credit to rms, total bank credit and bank assets overall. Finally, loan
rates slighlty decrease on impact or do not react signicantly.
Finally, we compare our results with the results we obtain in the FADL framework using
the measure of the aggregate-capital-to assets ratio shock for US commercial banks esti-
mated by Berrospide and Edge (2010), henceforth BE. In their paper, they estimate a small
monetary VAR with six variables: real GDP growth, core GDP price ination, the federal
funds rate, the growth in total loans granted by commercial banks and savings and thrift
institutions in the US, the aggregate capital-to-assets ratio of US commercial banks taken
from the Federal Reserves FRED database, and, last, the lending standard indicator pro-
vided by the SLOOS (in that order). In a very standard way, they then extract an aggregate
series of shocks to the capital ratio variable by assuming short term restrictions consistent
with a Cholesky orthogonalization of the covariance matrix of estimated VAR residuals. We
replicate their procedure here and plot the estimated aggregate capital ratio shock (hence
BE shock) in Figure 14 against our own measure. Due to the limited availability of some of
the data used, the series starts in 1990 Q4 only. The BE series has a much larger standard
deviation than our estimate, close to one percentage point. This higher volatility of the BE
shock series may reect a combination of factors. First, the aggregate capital ratio measure
provided by the Federal Reserve relates to all commercial banks in the US, instead of the
biggest BHCs. It may thus be a¤ected by the behaviour of smaller or specialized institu-
tions. Furthermore, the commercial bank level, as opposed to the consolidated one, may not
be the relevant one for setting the capital ratio target of banks belonging to larger groups.
Nevertheless, the BE shock series is positively correlated to ours (with a correlation of 0.46).
In particular, both measures identify large negative capital ratio shocks in 1994 and 2008,
and peaks in 2004 and early 2009, as the US Treasury started injecting fresh capital into
some banks and the Fed launched the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program requiring
large banks to speed up their capital building. For comparison purposes, we then run once
more the FADL regressions as in equation 6, while replacing our measure of the aggregate
capital-to-assets ratio shock by the BE shock.
Figures 15 and 16 show the responses of the same macro and credit variables to both
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bank capital ratio shocks, the BE one and ours (denoted MS below for convenience). Both
shocks have been standardized, so that the sizes of the responses can be compared. Note
also that panels 8, 14 and 15 of Figure 16 present the reactions of the same aggregate
banking indicators as in BE, so that the responses to the BE shock plotted here are directly
comparable with the responses shown in their paper.24
Contrary to BE, we rst nd that loans by commercial banks and thrift institutions
and lending standards do not react much to a positive BE capital ratio shock, total loans
increasing slowly only after one year. Since the short term responses need not be restricted
in our set-up, we however nd a negative response of output growth on impact to their
shock, while in their paper they only observe a signicant decline in GDP growth two years
after the shock. Interestingly, we can also obtain the responses of all the macro variables
in our rich dataset to their estimated capital ratio shock. In particular, looking at credit
aggregates, we nd that the contractionary response of total commercial bank credit as well
as most of its components (with the exception of consumer loans) is rather subdued after
a positive BE shock. This however contrasts with their nding of a surge in the specic
credit aggregate included in their VAR, suggesting that the latter response may be spurious,
probably due to a misspecication of their small-scale VAR or an inadequate identication
scheme. Last but not least, we also nd that bank loan rates do not react or decrease
on impact following a BE deleveraging shock, which suggests that they did not identify
a credit supply shock. Finally, the response of GDP to the MS shock is both larger and
more pesistent than in the BE case. Both ndings point to signicant benets of both
extracting the capital ratio shock from a microeconomic database and working within a
data-rich macroeconomic framework as we do here.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the macroeconomic consequences of a shock to the capital-
to-asset ratio of large US bank holding companies. An important feature of our work is
that we consider a rich database of both bank balance sheet information and macroeco-
nomic aggregates, thus bridging the usual gap in the literature between micro and macro
assessments of the consequences of bank capital ratio uctuations for lending and growth,
and overcoming some of the standard endogeneity issues.
We have found robust evidence that our measure of leverage shocks to the large US banks
24Note however that they present IRFs of standardized variables (growth rates) while we show cumulated
IRFs for stationnarized variables.
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matters for understanding uctuations in credit aggregates as well as the US business cycle.
Our framework is exible enough to allow us to compute the responses of the macroeconomic
variables in our database to any exogenous series of shocks constructed in other papers.
Then, comparing the responses of activity and credit aggregates to our capital ratio shock
with the responses obtained when using a capital ratio shock extracted using a small macro
VAR and recursive ordering (as in Berrospide and Edge, 2010), we notably obtain larger
and more persistent impacts. Besides, bank lending contracts and lending rates rise after
a deleveraging shock as we measure it, suggesting that we have identied a negative credit
supply shock. This comparison illustrates the benets of both extracting the capital ratio
shock from a microeconomic database and of working within a data-rich macroeconomic
framework, as we do here.
Although we feel the evidence presented here can be a useful contribution to the policy
debate about the pros and cons of the heightened capital requirements being imposed on
large banking corporations, we see our results as providing at best an upper bound of the
likely short-run adverse economic impact of a surprise increase in capital requirements. In-
deed, as said earlier, our capital ratio shocks at the individual level, however convincingly
orthogonalized to possible credit demand e¤ects, remain a combination of various unob-
servable inuences a¤ecting bank leverage. Tighter regulations, if any, are only one possible
source of the volatility of the innovations to capital ratios we can observe in our sample.
That said, our results lend support to the view that a switch to tighter capital regulations
should be gradual and operate preferably through accumulated earnings in order to min-
imize its short-run negative consequences for the economy (see e.g. Kashyap, Stein and
Hanson, 2010).
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A Data
A.1 Denition and sources of bank variables
Variable name FR Y-9C code or details of variable denition
Total assets BHCK2170
Equity BHCK3210
Net income BHCK4340
Net chargeo¤s BHCK4635 - BHCK4605
Real estate loans BHCK1410
C&I loans BHCK1763 + BHCK1764
Capital to assets ratio Equity / Total assets * 100
Return on assets Net income / Quarterly average of Total assets * 400
Net chargeo¤s to assets ratio Net chargeo¤s / Quarterly average of Total assets * 400
Size log(Total assets)
A.2 List of banks included in the panel
Note: Assets are expressed $ thousand.
No. RSSID Name M in. assets Max. assets # Obs. T ime span
Start End
1 1951350 C IT IGROUP INC . 6,69E+08 2,36E+09 46 1998q4 2010q1
2 1073757 BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION 2,39E+07 2,34E+09 96 1986q2 2010q1
3 1039502 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO . 5,60E+07 2,25E+09 96 1986q2 2010q1
4 1120754 WELLS FARGO & COMPANY 1,96E+07 1,31E+09 96 1986q2 2010q1
5 1042351 C IT ICORP 1,83E+08 9,71E+08 77 1986q2 2005q2
6 1073551 WACHOVIA CORPORATION 1,94E+07 8,12E+08 90 1986q2 2008q3
7 2816906 TAUNUS CORPORATION 1,71E+08 7,60E+08 44 1999q2 2010q1
8 2945824 METLIFE . INC . 2,52E+08 5,66E+08 37 2001q1 2010q1
9 1068294 BANK ONE CORPORATION 1,12E+07 3,27E+08 73 1986q2 2004q2
10 1037115 J.P. MORGAN & CO . INCORPORATED 7,27E+07 2,99E+08 58 1986q2 2000q3
11 1069778 PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP. INC .. THE 2,02E+07 2,91E+08 96 1986q2 2010q1
12 1111435 STATE STREET CORPORATION 6172269 2,87E+08 96 1986q2 2010q1
13 1119794 U .S . BANCORP 1,70E+07 2,82E+08 96 1986q2 2010q1
14 1026016 BANKAMERICA CORPORATION 9,28E+07 2,65E+08 49 1986q2 1998q2
15 1113514 FLEETBOSTON FINANCIAL CORPORATION 1,00E+07 2,12E+08 72 1986q2 2004q1
16 1131787 SUNTRUST BANKS. INC . 1,88E+07 1,89E+08 96 1986q2 2010q1
17 1069125 NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION 1,25E+07 1,55E+08 90 1986q2 2008q3
18 1033470 BANK OF NEW YORK COMPANY. INC .. THE 1,84E+07 1,26E+08 85 1986q2 2007q2
19 1199778 FIRST CHICAGO NBD CORPORATION 1,86E+07 1,22E+08 50 1986q2 1998q3
20 1040795 CHASE MANHATTAN CORPORATION 9,00E+07 1,21E+08 39 1986q2 1995q4
21 1070345 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 3142089 1,20E+08 96 1986q2 2010q1
22 1027095 WELLS FARGO & COMPANY 4,27E+07 1,09E+08 50 1986q2 1998q3
23 1068025 KEYCORP 8633737 1,05E+08 96 1986q2 2010q1
24 1245415 HARRIS FINANCIAL CORP. 9880000 8,83E+07 96 1986q2 2010q1
25 1378434 UNIONBANCAL CORPORATION 4091351 8,56E+07 96 1986q2 2010q1
26 1199611 NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION 7674379 8,21E+07 96 1986q2 2010q1
27 1025608 BANCWEST CORPORATION 3346544 7,99E+07 96 1986q2 2010q1
28 1112076 BANKBOSTON CORPORATION 3,04E+07 7,76E+07 54 1986q2 1999q3
29 1201028 FIRST CHICAGO CORPORATION 3,91E+07 7,57E+07 38 1986q2 1995q3
30 1136157 WACHOVIA CORPORATION 1,75E+07 7,56E+07 61 1986q2 2001q2
31 1020340 HARRIS BANKCORP. INC . 1,16E+07 6,82E+07 82 1989q4 2010q1
32 1199844 COMERICA INCORPORATED 9285234 6,79E+07 96 1986q2 2010q1
33 1078529 BBVA USA BANCSHARES. INC . 3494388 6,78E+07 96 1986q2 2010q1
34 1871159 MBNA CORPORATION 5146165 6,30E+07 60 1991q1 2005q4
35 1416774 NATIONSBANK TEXAS BANCORPORATION. INC . 3,04E+07 6,24E+07 33 1990q1 1998q1
36 1199497 M&I LLC 4866038 6,08E+07 86 1986q2 2007q3
37 1021075 REPUBLIC NEW YORK CORPORATION 1,68E+07 5,99E+07 54 1986q2 1999q3
38 1023538 FIRST INTERSTATE BANCORP 4,89E+07 5,91E+07 40 1986q2 1996q1
39 1068191 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INCORPORATED 7016598 5,60E+07 96 1986q2 2010q1
40 1078604 AMSOUTH BANCORPORATION 5264186 5,43E+07 82 1986q2 2006q3
41 1079441 SOUTHTRUST CORPORATION 4571219 5,39E+07 74 1986q2 2004q3
42 1068762 MELLON FINANCIAL CORPORATION 2,87E+07 5,10E+07 84 2013q2 2033q4
43 1078332 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORPORATION 3844149 4,99E+07 73 1986q2 2004q2
44 1116300 CORESTATES FINANCIAL CORP 1,21E+07 4,85E+07 48 1986q2 1998q1
45 1076776 BARNETT BANKS. INC . 1,62E+07 4,65E+07 47 1986q2 1997q4
46 1093586 BOATMENS BANCSHARES. INC . 8890520 4,12E+07 43 1986q2 1996q4
47 1094640 FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORPORATION 5234059 4,01E+07 96 1986q2 2010q1
48 1033872 SUMMIT BANCORP. 5555961 3,97E+07 59 1986q2 2000q4
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49 1199479 FIRSTAR HOLDINGS CORPORATION 6443605 3,87E+07 54 1986q2 1999q3
50 1248612 FIRST FIDELITY BANCORPORATION 2,82E+07 3,62E+07 32 1988q1 1995q4
51 1094211 MERCANTILE BANCORPORATION INC . 6287766 3,60E+07 53 1986q2 1999q2
52 1427471 FLEET NEW YORK. INC . 1,21E+07 3,54E+07 32 1989q4 1997q3
53 2467175 UNION PLANTERS HOLDING CORPORATION 7262128 3,50E+07 32 1996q4 2004q3
54 1025701 U .S . BANCORP 8411418 3,40E+07 45 1986q2 1997q2
55 1021758 NATWEST HOLDINGS INC . 1,09E+07 3,37E+07 40 1986q2 1996q1
56 1033993 FIRST FIDELITY INCORPORATED 1,40E+07 3,35E+07 39 2016q2 2025q3
57 1020603 CONTINENTAL BANK CORPORATION 2,16E+07 3,34E+07 33 1986q2 1994q2
58 1035166 NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANCORP NJ 3679044 3,20E+07 32 2016q2 2023q4
59 1473562 BANC ONE TEXAS CORPORATION 1,28E+07 3,13E+07 43 1990q1 2000q3
60 1022362 LASALLE NATIONAL CORPORATION 3431221 2,90E+07 38 1989q4 1999q1
61 1023314 C IT ICORP HOLDINGS. INC . 1,54E+07 2,89E+07 39 1990q1 1999q3
62 1023453 SUNTRUST BANKS OF GEORGIA . INC . 9459810 2,89E+07 40 1990q1 1999q4
63 1250932 BANC ONE OHIO CORPORATION 1,50E+07 2,83E+07 32 1990q1 1997q4
64 1072237 CRESTAR FINANCIAL CORPORATION 8418294 2,78E+07 55 1986q2 1999q4
65 2081124 GREENPOINT FINANCIAL CORP. 6955179 2,70E+07 43 1994q1 2004q3
66 1199648 FIRST OF AMERICA BANK CORPORATION 5461940 2,46E+07 47 1986q2 1997q4
67 1199705 OLD KENT FINANCIAL CORPORATION 4507645 2,45E+07 60 1986q2 2001q1
68 1140743 M IDLANTIC CORPORATION 1,33E+07 2,43E+07 36 1986q4 1995q3
69 1024058 FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION 4887095 2,33E+07 69 1986q2 2003q2
70 1078921 HIBERNIA CORPORATION 3051117 2,32E+07 78 1986q2 2005q3
71 1078426 FIRST AMERICAN CORPORATION 4968735 2,22E+07 54 1986q2 1999q3
72 2744894 FIRST BANCORP 4017352 2,06E+07 46 1998q4 2010q1
73 1072291 FIRST UNION CORPORATION OF VIRGINIA 5309175 2,03E+07 45 1986q2 1997q2
74 1074660 ALLFIRST FINANCIAL INC . 4768073 1,89E+07 68 1986q2 2003q1
75 2389941 TCF FINANCIAL CORPORATION 7429623 1,82E+07 52 1997q2 2010q1
76 1049341 COMMERCE BANCSHARES. INC . 4917787 1,81E+07 96 1986q2 2010q1
77 2801546 W HOLDING COMPANY. INC . 3374588 1,81E+07 42 1999q4 2010q1
78 1070251 STAR BANC CORPORATION 3688217 1,73E+07 50 1986q2 1998q3
79 1102367 CULLEN/FROST BANKERS. INC . 3042869 1,68E+07 96 1986q2 2010q1
80 1028739 BANC ONE ARIZONA CORPORATION 1,01E+07 1,58E+07 47 1986q2 1997q4
81 1023060 MERIDIAN BANCORP. INC . 6313644 1,52E+07 40 1986q2 1996q1
82 1025309 BANK OF HAWAII CORPORATION 4653763 1,50E+07 96 1986q2 2010q1
83 1072107 SIGNET BANKING CORPORATION 8522229 1,30E+07 46 1986q2 1997q3
84 1888193 W ILM INGTON TRUST CORPORATION 3969244 1,26E+07 75 1991q3 2010q1
85 1246702 PEOPLES MUTUAL HOLDINGS 5482306 1,23E+07 72 1988q3 2006q2
86 1199714 M ICHIGAN NATIONAL CORPORATION 7812468 1,20E+07 60 1986q2 2001q1
87 1071968 FIRST VIRGINIA BANKS. INC . 3602841 1,13E+07 69 1986q2 2003q2
88 1074875 CENTRAL FIDELITY BANKS. INC . 3634415 1,08E+07 46 1986q2 1997q3
89 1246216 FRANKLIN RESOURCES. INC . 5900311 9942115 36 2001q2 2010q1
90 2894230 D ISCOUNT BANCORP. INC . 4610604 9519594 41 2000q1 2010q1
91 1080371 LOUISIANA BANC ONE CORPORATION 3421048 9507297 50 1986q2 1998q3
92 1200432 BANC ONE INDIANA CORPORATION 4284241 9400736 38 2016q2 2025q2
93 2847115 SANTANDER BANCORP 6571193 9288663 40 2000q2 2010q1
94 1028953 WEST ONE BANCORP 3264714 9244503 38 1986q2 1995q3
95 1080148 SUNTRUST BANKS OF TENNESSEE. INC . 4962702 9114637 42 2016q2 2026q2
96 3005332 F .N .B . CORPORATION 4062977 8799534 36 2001q2 2010q1
97 1199488 BANC ONE W ISCONSIN CORPORATION 3846284 8755366 35 2016q2 2024q3
98 2477754 INVESTORS BANCORP. MHC 3172821 8738437 53 1997q1 2010q1
99 1079638 BANK SOUTH CORPORATION 3024519 7684650 39 1986q2 1995q4
100 1075126 R IGGS NATIONAL CORPORATION 4426221 7637650 76 1986q2 2005q1
101 1072554 SOUTH CAROLINA NATIONAL CORPORATION 4265638 7424140 38 1986q2 1995q3
102 2947435 BBVA PR HOLDING CORPORATION 4724153 7045588 38 2000q4 2010q1
103 1034888 CHEM ICAL NEW JERSEY HOLDINGS. INC . 3167695 6217134 34 2016q2 2024q2
104 1130892 PREM IER BANCORP. INCORPORATED 3760037 5511975 38 1986q2 1995q3
A.3 Macroeconomic time series used in the factor analysis
The transformation codes are: 1 = no transformation; 2 = rst di¤erence; 4 = logarithm;
5 = rst di¤erence of logarithm; 0 = variable not used in the estimation (only used for
transforming other variables).
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No. Series Code T-Code Series Description
Activity and labour market
1 CUMFN 2 Capacity Utilization : M anufacturing (NAICS)
2 GDPC1 5 Real G ross Domestic Product, 1 Decim al
3 GPDI 5 Gross Private Domestic Investm ent
4 INDPRO 5 Industria l P roduction Index
5 NAPM 2 ISM Manufacturing: PM I Composite Index
6 PAYEMS 5 Total Nonfarm Payrolls: A ll Employees
7 RPCE 5 Real PCE : Personal consumption exp enditures (PCE)
8 RPCE-DUR 5 Real PCE Durable goods
9 RPCE-NONDUR 5 Real PCE Nondurab le goods
10 UNRATE 1 C ivilian Unemployment Rate
11 USCOINALG 5 US COMPOSITE INDEX - 4 COINCIDENT INDICATORS
Prices
12 CPIAUCSL 5 Consumer Price Index for A ll U rban Consumers: A ll Item s
13 CPILFESL 5 Consumer Price Index for A ll U rban Consumers: A ll Item s Less Food & Energy
14 CRBSPOT 5 CRB Spot Index (commodity price index)
15 IR 5 Import (End Use): A ll commodities
16 O ILPRICE 5 Spot O il P rice: West Texas Interm ediate
17 PPIACO 5 Producer Price Index: A ll Commodities
18 PPIFGS 5 Producer Price Index: F in ished Goods
Housing
19 HOUST 4 Housing Starts: Total: New Privately Owned Housing Units Started
20 USCSHPE 5 US S&P/CASE-SHILLER NATIONAL HOME PRICE INDEX SADJ
Interest rates and corporate spreads
21 AAA-spread 1 BOND YIELD : MOODYS AAA CORPORATE (% PER ANNUM) - 10 y. Treas. y ie ld
22 BAA-spread 1 BOND YIELD : MOODYS BAA CORPORATE (% PER ANNUM) - 10 y. Treas. y ie ld
23 EFF-EXCHUS 5 EFF.EXCH.RATE, NOMINAL, USD AG . MAJOR CURRENCIES
24 FEDFUNDS 1 FEDFUNDS, E¤ective Federal Funds Rate
25 GS1 1 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
26 GS10 1 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
27 GS2 1 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
28 GS3 1 3-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
29 GS5 1 5-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
30 R IFSGFSM06-N .M 1 6-month Treasury b ill secondary market rate d iscount basis
31 S&PCOMP 5 S&P 500 COMPOSITE - PRICE INDEX
Credit : Bank credit + subcomponents + lending standards
1 BK-C IL 5 Commercia l and industria l loans, a ll commercia l banks (Fed H8)
2 BK-CLK 5 Consumer loans, a ll commercia l banks (Fed H8)
3 BK-CRED 5 Bank cred it, a ll commercia l banks (Fed H8)
4 BK-DEPO 5 Deposits, a ll commercia l banks (Fed H8)
5 BK-LLEASES 5 Loans and leases in bank cred it, a ll commercia l banks (Fed H8)
6 BK-REL 5 Real estate loans, a ll commercia l banks (Fed H8)
7 BK-TOTASS 5 Total assets, a ll commercia l banks (Fed H8)
8 TOTLOANS-BK-SAV 5 Total loans commercia l banks + savings institutions (Fed Z1)
9 SPREAD PERSONAL 1 Lending rates at commercia l banks, 24 Months p ersonal loans (SCC , Fed G19)
10 SPREAD CAR 1 Lendin f rates at commercia l banks, 48 Months new car loans (SCC , Fed G19)
11 SPREAD CIL 1 C&I loans rates, a ll loans (STBL, Fed E2)
12 SPREAD CIL Large 1 C&I loans rates, m ore than $1 billion (STBL, Fed E2)
13 SPREAD CIL Small 1 C& I loans rates, less than $100 thousands (STBL, Fed E2)
14 DRTSCILM 1 Net Percent. o f Domestic Resp ondents T ighten ing Standards for C& I loans to large rm s
15 EQTA 1 Total Equity / Total A ssets, a ll commercia l banks (Source: FRED)
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N mean sd p25 p50 p75
Assets ($m) 6,137 76,365.25 216220.96 9,055.81 19,709.15 48,207.00
Capital-to-assets 6,137 8.05 5.13 6.49 7.54 8.67
ROA 6,137 2.64 3.33 1.22 2.42 3.79
ROE 6,137 27.53 213.23 16.29 31.92 49.29
Loans-to-assets 6,137 60.52 14.99 56.30 64.10 69.67
Mortgage loans-to-assets 6,137 26.46 12.76 18.67 26.46 33.70
C&I loans-to-assets 6,137 16.26 8.01 11.33 15.87 20.75
Net chargeo¤s-to-assets 6,137 1.16 1.46 0.30 0.70 1.45
Table 1: Summary statistics for bank variables.
N mean sd p25 p50 p75
SP500 volatility 96 0.44 0.27 0.28 0.38 0.49
Exp. short rate change 96 0.34 0.48 0.02 0.29 0.63
Exp. GDP growth 96 2.64 0.63 2.32 2.67 3.01
Table 2: Summary statistics for macroeconomic expectations variables.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged capital ratio 0:9328 0:9309 0:9318 0:9307
(98.48) (96.08) (95.67) (94.72)
Size 0:0940 0:1012 0:0969 0:0995
(3.73) (4.02) (3.82) (3.95)
ROA -0.0055 -0.0054  0:0065 -0.0059
(-1.45) (-1.43) (-1.74) (-1.60)
Net chargeo¤s / assets 0:0255 0:0242 0:0260 0:0244
(2.31) (2.16) (2.35) (2.18)
Real estate loans / assets -0.0016 -0.0021 -0.0018 -0.0020
(-1.07) (-1.32) (-1.20) (-1.29)
C&I loans / assets  0:0051 -0.0035  0:0042 -0.0036
(-2.09) (-1.43) (-1.75) (-1.46)
FHC status 0.0102 0.0126 0.0203 0.0200
(0.21) (0.25) (0.41) (0.39)
Merger dummy 0:1053 0:1068 0:1046 0:1058
(2.52) (2.57) (2.51) (2.54)
SP500 volatility  0:0374 -0.0302  0:0387
(-2.04) (-1.58) (-2.14)
Exp. change policy rate 0:0680 0:0545
(3.26) (2.57)
Exp. change GDP growth  0:0422 -0.0331
(-2.08) (-1.64)
SWIPC1 0:0271 0:0225
(2.26) (1.86)
SWIPC2 0.0113 0.0092
(1.56) (1.27)
SWIPC3 0.0011 -0.0023
(0.13) (-0.26)
Observations 6026 6026 6026 6026
R2 0.872 0.873 0.873 0.873
Table 3: Determinants of BHC capital-to-asset ratios. Note: The dependent variable is the
capital to asset ratio of individual banks as in equation (2). The panel OLS regression is run with
bank xed e¤ects. Robust t-stats are given in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10,
5 and 1 percent levels respectively. SWIPC1 to SWIPC3 refer to the macro shocks extracted from
the large dataset X of real and nominal macroeconomic non-banking variables using a factor model
as explained in text. A constant and seasonal dummies are included but not reported.
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(Assetsi;t)
< 0 > 0
"i;t < 0 (Equityi;t) < 0 5:4 11:4
 0 1:8 31:9
"i;t  0 (Equityi;t) < 0 3:1 0:3
 0 21:1 25:2
Table 4: Breakdown of individual capital ratio shocks according to the sign of contempora-
neous changes in bank equity and total assets (in percentage of total number of individual
shocks).
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F-test p-value R-squared
ACTIVITY MEASURES (L) "(L) Total Marginal
Capital utilization 0.0000 0.0568 0.7991 0.0267
GDP 0.0000 0.0917 0.7024 0.0185
Investment 0.0000 0.0088 0.5992 0.0422
Industrial production 0.0000 0.0329 0.7835 0.0406
PMI 0.0000 0.1407 0.5068 0.0401
Consumption 0.0000 0.6062 0.6368 0.0117
Cons: durables 0.0000 0.3421 0.3975 0.0238
Cons: non-durables 0.0000 0.0716 0.5985 0.0284
Employment 0.0000 0.3970 0.8702 0.0072
CPI 0.0000 0.0156 0.7660 0.0308
Housing 0.0000 0.0361 0.9651 0.0043
House prices 0.0000 0.3250 0.6487 0.0536
FFR 0.0000 0.8441 0.9643 0.0006
T-Bill 10Y 0.0000 0.2398 0.9590 0.0012
B-spread 0.0000 0.0008 0.9276 0.0151
CREDIT MEASURES (L) "(L) Total Marginal
Commercial and industrial loans 0.0000 0.0595 0.8002 0.0267
Consumer loans 0.0014 0.0407 0.2616 0.0966
Bank credit 0.0000 0.0002 0.3646 0.1288
Deposits 0.0216 0.1429 0.2625 0.1039
Loans&Leases in bank credit 0.0000 0.0072 0.5140 0.1077
RE loans 0.2277 0.1274 0.2425 0.0643
Loans Banks + Thrift 0.0000 0.0004 0.4404 0.1263
Total loans 0.0000 0.0040 0.6856 0.0790
Spread Personal Loans 0.0002 0.2458 0.9310 0.0020
Spread Car Loans 0.0124 0.9282 0.9357 0.0006
Spread All CIL 0.0000 0.0014 0.8307 0.0328
Spread Large CIL 0.0000 0.0009 0.8196 0.0333
Spread Small CIL 0.0000 0.0684 0.8821 0.0120
Standard 0.0000 0.0382 0.8668 0.0136
Equity / Assets 0.0000 0.0000 0.5131 0.3183
Table 5: Testing the factor structure of individual macroeconomic series. Note: The F-test
tests the null that the coe¢ cients in the FADL regression of a given macro series are jointly zero
(col. 1). In the second column, we test the null that only coe¢ cients of the bank leverage shocks
are jointly zero. P-values are obtained by bootstrap. Columns 3 and 4 display the share of variance
explained by the FADL regressors and the marginal explanatory power of the current and lagged
bank leverage shocks, respectively.
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Figure 1: Share of banks in sample out of total US bank assets (solid line) and number of
banks in panel through time (dashed line).
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Figure 2: Estimated aggregate bank capital ratio shocks. Vertical lines delimit NBER
recesssion dates.
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Figure 3: Estimated aggregate bank capital ratio shocks using various samples of BHCs:
all the 104 banks in the baseline sample (solid), the 25 largest (dashed) and the 50 largest
(dotted line).
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions of macroeconomic variables in Xt to a negative bank
leverage shock (with 70 percent condence intervals)
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions of agregate credit and banking indicators to a negative
bank leverage shock (with 70 percent condence intervals).
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Figure 6: Robustness to FADL specication choices: responses of selected macro variables to
a positive bank capital ratio shock assuming di¤erent lag selection in the FADL regressions
([1 1 4] means one lag for the autoregressive part, one for each of the macro shocks and four
for the capital ratio shock).
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Figure 7: Robustness to FADL specication choices: responses of credit variables to a
positive bank capital ratio shock assuming di¤erent lag selection in the FADL regressions
([1 1 4] means one lag for the autoregressive part, one for each of the macro shocks and four
for the capital ratio shock).
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Figure 8: Impulse responses of macroeconomic variables in Xt to a negative bank leverage
shock, estimated over the pre-crisis period (up to 2008 Q2, with 70 percent condence
intervals).
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Figure 9: Impulse responses of credit and banking indicators to a negative bank leverage
shock, estimated over the pre-crisis period (up to 2008 Q2, with 70 percent condence
intervals).
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Figure 10: Impulse response functions of macroeconomic variables in Xt to an asymmetric
shock reducing bank leverage (with 70 percent condence intervals)
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Figure 11: Impulse response functions of agregate credit and banking indicators to an
asymmetric shock reducing bank leverage (with 70 percent condence intervals).
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Figure 12: Impulse response functions of macroeconomic variables in Xt to an asymmetric
shock increasing bank leverage (with 70 percent condence intervals)
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Figure 13: Impulse response functions of agregate credit and banking indicators to an
asymmetric shock increasing bank leverage (with 70 percent condence intervals).
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Figure 14: Alternative measures of aggregate bank capital ratio shocks : our measure (solid
line) vs BE measure (dashed line).
54
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Capital Utilization
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
GDP
1 2 3 4 5 6
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
Investment
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Industrial Production
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
PMI
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Employment
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Consumption
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Cons: durables
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
Cons: nondurables
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
CPI
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
Housing
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
House prices
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
FFR
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
T-Bill 10Y
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
B-spread
MS BE
Figure 15: Comparison of responses of non-banking macroeconomic variables to a positive
bank capital ratio shock as we estimate it (MS) with responses to the bank capital ratio
shock as computed in Berrospide and Edge (2010) (BE). The common period of estimation
of the IRFs is 1990 Q4 to 2010 Q1 due to the shorter history of some of the variables used
for the estimation of the BE shock.
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Figure 16: Comparison of responses of credit and banking variables to a positive bank
capital ratio shock as we estimate it (MS) with responses to the bank capital ratio shock
as computed in Berrospide and Edge (2010) (BE). The common period of estimation of the
IRFs is 1990 Q4 to 2010 Q1 due to the shorter history of some of the variables used for the
estimation of the BE shock.
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